SPF explicitly authorizes any server to send mail
The SPF record on `your domain` ends in an `all` mechanism that resolves to a pass — either written as `+all`, or as a bare `all` with no qualifier, which RFC 7208 defaults to `+all`.
Why it matters
The SPF record on `your domain` ends in an `all` mechanism that resolves to a pass — either written as `+all`, or as a bare `all` with no qualifier, which RFC 7208 defaults to `+all`. Both mean 'accept mail from any server, anywhere' as your explicit policy, which makes SPF actively vouch for forgeries instead of ruling them out. This is almost always a mistake: someone intended `all` to just close the record and did not realise the missing qualifier grants universal permission.
How ShipReady detects it
Email-authentication DNS records (DMARC / SPF). Almost every AI-built SaaS sends transactional email — password resets, magic links, receipts — through Resend, SendGrid or Postmark. Setting that up gets the mail delivered; it does not stop anyone else sending mail that claims to come from the same domain. Without a DMARC policy, a receiving server has no instruction to reject a forgery, so an attacker can send "reset your password" from the product's own domain and the message will land in the inbox looking authentic. This check is almost entirely DNS rather than HTTP — one exception is MTA-STS, whose policy is only half-published in DNS; the other half is a file fetched over HTTPS (see _check_mta_sts). Nearly everything else here is the most deterministic kind of check the scanner has: a record either exists or it does not, so there is no heuristic and no false-positive surface. The one place judgement is required is deciding WHICH domain to ask about — see _organizational_domain.
Detection is deterministic. ShipReady reports this only when it observes the condition directly, and prefers to miss a real problem over inventing one. Rule version 1.10.0.
How to fix it
This is the prompt ShipReady puts in your report — written to be pasted straight into Cursor, Claude Code, or whichever assistant built the app.
The SPF record on your domain ends its `all` mechanism with a PASS qualifier — either written explicitly as `+all`, or as a bare `all` with no qualifier, which RFC 7208 defaults to `+all`. This authorizes literally any server to send mail as your domain and pass SPF, which defeats the point of publishing SPF at all. Change the final mechanism to `~all` (softfail, safe default while you confirm every legitimate sender is covered) or `-all` (hardfail, once you're confident), never a bare or `+` qualified `all`.
Frequently asked questions
- What does "SPF explicitly authorizes any server to send mail" mean?
- The SPF record on `your domain` ends in an `all` mechanism that resolves to a pass — either written as `+all`, or as a bare `all` with no qualifier, which RFC 7208 defaults to `+all`.
- How serious is it?
- ShipReady rates this high. Fix before launch. A real weakness that an attacker can act on.
- How do I fix it?
- Paste the fix prompt on this page into Cursor, Claude Code or your AI editor. It is the same prompt ShipReady puts in your report.
- Can I check my own site?
- Yes — ShipReady scans up to ten pages of any public site for free and reports this alongside every other check. The free report lists every issue it finds and shows full evidence and a fix prompt for the critical and high-severity ones; medium and low findings are counted and unlock on Pro.
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